The Social Utility of Ambivalence: Being Ambivalent on Controversial Issues Is Recognized as Competence. by Pillaud, V. et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 22 June 2018
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00961
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 June 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 961
Edited by:
Mario Weick,
University of Kent, United Kingdom
Reviewed by:
Maria Giuseppina Pacilli,
University of Perugia, Italy
Geoffrey Durso,
The Ohio State University,
United States
*Correspondence:
Fabrizio Butera
fabrizio.butera@unil.ch
†Vincent Pillaud,
University of Caen Normandy, Caen,
France
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Personality and Social Psychology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 07 October 2017
Accepted: 24 May 2018
Published: 22 June 2018
Citation:
Pillaud V, Cavazza N and Butera F
(2018) The Social Utility of
Ambivalence: Being Ambivalent on
Controversial Issues Is Recognized as
Competence. Front. Psychol. 9:961.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00961
The Social Utility of Ambivalence:
Being Ambivalent on Controversial
Issues Is Recognized as Competence
Vincent Pillaud 1†, Nicoletta Cavazza 2 and Fabrizio Butera 1*
1 Institut de Psychologie, Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale, Université de Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland, 2Dipartimento
di Comunicazione ed Economia, Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia, Modena, Italy
Research on attitudinal ambivalence is flourishing, but no research has studied how
others perceive its expression. We tested the hypothesis that the expression of attitudinal
ambivalence could be positively valued if it signals careful consideration of an issue. More
specifically, ambivalence should be judged higher on social utility (competence) but not on
social desirability (warmth), compared to clear-cut attitudes. This should be the case for
controversial (vs. consensual) issues, where ambivalence can signal some competence.
The participants in four experiments indeed evaluated ambivalence higher on a measure
of social utility, compared to clear-cut (pro-normative and counter-normative) attitudes,
when the attitude objects were controversial; they judged pro-normative attitudes
higher for both social utility and social desirability when the attitude objects were
consensual. Attitudinal ambivalence can therefore be positively valued, as it is perceived
as competence when the expression of criticism is socially accepted.
Keywords: ambivalence, attitudes, social value, judgment, controversy, warmth and competence
INTRODUCTION
It has been more than 40 years now since Scott (1968) and Kaplan (1972) introduced the concept
of attitudinal ambivalence to describe the possibility that an individual could hold both positive
and negative attitudes toward the same attitude object. Following their seminal work, an important
body of research has been devoted to better understand the consequences of holding an ambivalent
attitude toward a wide range of outcomes, from predicting behavior to well-being (e.g., Conner
and Armitage, 2008). This work represents a very valuable research effort, as it appears that
ambivalent attitudes are a widespread phenomenon (Basinger and Lavine, 2005; Weisbrode,
2012). Notwithstanding the importance of the phenomenon and the wealth of research that has
investigated the consequences for those who hold ambivalent attitudes (for a recent review, see
van Harreveld et al., 2015), only a limited number of studies have studied social perceptions of
the expression of ambivalence, and no study has examined whether it could be viewed as having
some social value. The present article aims to fill this gap in the literature by examining how
individuals who express attitudinal ambivalence are judged in comparison with individuals who
express univalent attitudes. More precisely, we hypothesized that ambivalence could be valued on
controversial attitude objects in that pondering the pros and cons of an issue signals a competent
judgment.
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ATTITUDINAL AMBIVALENCE: STRENGTH
OR WEAKNESS?
Attitudinal ambivalence has primarily been studied as a
dimension of attitude strength (Thompson et al., 1995; for a
review, see Conner and Sparks, 2002). In comparison with
univalent attitudes, ambivalent attitudes have been shown to be
less stable over time, more pliable, less likely to guide information
processing, and less predictive of intentions and further behavior
(Armitage and Conner, 2004). In this perspective, ambivalent
attitudes are presented as weak attitudes (Sawicki et al., 2013).
Furthermore, as ambivalence is derived from mixed attitudes
that rely on conflict and indecision, it has often been associated
with cognitive dissonance (Priester and Petty, 1996; Clark et al.,
2008; van Harreveld et al., 2009a). Consequently, ambivalent
individuals who experience cognitive dissonance have been
described as willing to “solve their ambivalence” (Festinger, 1957;
Newby-Clark et al., 2002). In line with this view, holding an
ambivalent attitude has been considered as an aversive state
(Nordgren et al., 2006) that potentially generates psychological
discomfort in decision-making situations (van Harreveld et al.,
2009b). Thus, the results above, combined with the finding that
ambivalent individuals seem to be motivated to reduce their
ambivalence (e.g., Bell and Esses, 1997, 2002), appear to suggest
that the expression of an ambivalent attitude may be viewed
negatively. However, other lines of research have portrayed it in a
more positive light.
Mixed attitudes can also lead to benefits (Rothman et al.,
2017). If attitudinal ambivalence is generally known to be
vulnerable to influence, as discussed above, it can increase the
likelihood of changing some specific behaviors for the better
(Armitage and Conner, 2000; Armitage and Arden, 2007).
For example, Lipkus et al. (2005) reported that attitudinal
ambivalence was positively linked to the desire to quit smoking
among teen smokers. Likewise, the intention to eat junk
food decreased more for ambivalent individuals compared to
univalent individuals when confronted with a negatively framed
persuasive message (Yan, 2015). Ambivalence can then be seen
as adaptive when it focuses on contributing to changing negative
behaviors. It can also provide advantages in intergroup relations.
For instance, Pagliaro et al. (2012) investigated how low-status
individuals can cope with social identity threats (namely, when
Italians were disadvantaged compared to the British) as a
function of their identification with their ingroup. They found
that low-identifiers, as opposed to high-identifiers, perceived
their ingroup as more variable (consisting of various positive
and negative traits rather than only positive traits). Interestingly,
these authors interpreted such attitudes as an adaptive form of
social creativity in the face of identity threat. Finally, Costarelli
(2011) described ambivalence toward out-groups as a more
“defensible, balanced, and realistic reaction” to the relevant
stereotypic traits of the out-group members (pp. 51–52). The
reasoning behind this statement is that endorsing an ambivalent
attitude allows the individuals to express negative attitudes that
fulfill their “need to be prejudiced” toward out-group members
while simultaneously expressing positive attitudes, which results
in a balanced position that might be positively perceived by
others. Therefore, some recent research has suggested that
the expression of ambivalent attitudes could also be positively
perceived.
THE SOCIAL VALUE OF ATTITUDINAL
AMBIVALENCE
Some attitude objects are more likely to arouse ambivalence
compared to others (Conner et al., 1998; Dahl et al., 2005). For
example, Breckler (2004) reported that 41.1% of the students
were ambivalent on nuclear power whereas only 11% were
ambivalent about legalized abortion and 15.1% about gun control
laws. Such different ratios could be the result of the salience of
the social norm associated with the attitude objects. When there
is a clear social norm (consensus), an ambivalent attitude could
then be seen as a deviant attitude in comparison with the socially
valued (univalent) one. Subsequently, it might be perceived less
positively and expressed less frequently. Conversely, when there
is a strong debate and competing arguments regarding an issue,
holding a certain degree of ambivalence could be positively
valued, as it might signal that one is aware of the complexity of
the issue.
Thus, as Maio and Haddock (2004, 2009) suggested,
ambivalent attitudes toward controversial issues could be valued.
Indeed, recent research by Pillaud et al. (2013) provides
direct support for this reasoning. These authors reported that
individuals displayed a more ambivalent attitude when they had
to present themselves in a positive way, and they did so especially
when they had to express themselves on a controversial attitude
object (e.g., Genetically Modified Organisms), as opposed to a
consensual attitude object (e.g., tooth brushing). In sum, contrary
to a longstanding tradition that views attitudinal ambivalence as
a weak form of attitudes and an aversive state, recent research
has revealed that individuals could express ambivalent attitudes
when they want to be positively evaluated, to the extent that the
attitude object is controversial.
WHY CAN ATTITUDINAL AMBIVALENCE
PROVIDE VALUE?
Why can one be positively valued when expressing ambivalent
attitudes? In the reasoning presented above, we suggested that
expressing ambivalence when treating a controversial issue might
signal that one is pondering the pros and the cons, which might
imply some sort of competence. However, to date, no research
has demonstrated that attitudinal ambivalence is associated with
competence. Despite the lack of direct evidence, literature on
social judgment provides important insights for this hypothesis.
Indeed, a well-established line of work has shown that people’s
judgments about individuals, groups (stereotypes), and objects
tend to be organized according to two main dimensions (Kervyn
et al., 2010), namely warmth and competence.
These two dimensions have been variously termed, for
instance, value vs. dynamism (Osgood, 1962), social desirability
vs. intellectual desirability (Rosenberg et al., 1968), self-
profitability vs. other-profitability (Peeters, 1992), communion
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vs. agency (Abele and Wojciszke, 2007), warmth vs. competence
(Fiske et al., 2002), and social desirability vs. social utility
(Dubois and Beauvois, 2005). If these different terms cover
similar concepts, they lead to different approaches in the study
of the social judgment (Beauvois and Dubois, 2009). The
approach proposed by Beauvois and Dubois (Beauvois, 1995;
Dubois and Beauvois, 2005) better fits the general purpose
of the present research, considering that social desirability
and social utility refer to the “social worth” conveyed by
individuals during an evaluative process (Beauvois and Dubois,
2009). In the present research, we want to study precisely why
individuals expressing attitudinal ambivalence can be valued.
Social desirability corresponds to the individuals’ ability to
obtain a positive evaluation from others; in this respect, social
desirability is the societal-level equivalent of a judgment of
warmth. Conversely, social utility corresponds to the ability to
satisfy the requirements of a given social environment and thus
to the individuals’ chances of success in social life (Dubois and
Beauvois, 2005; Darnon et al., 2009). In this respect, social utility
is the societal-level equivalent of a judgment of competence.
Based on this distinction, it is then possible to predict that
attitudinal ambivalence should be valued in terms of social utility
but not necessarily in terms of social desirability.
An analysis of the literature on the effects of attitudinal
ambivalence provides some indirect support for this idea. On the
one hand, research in which ambivalence has been studied for its
higher proclivity to be influenced by others could be linked to
social desirability. In particular, some research by Bell and Esses
(1997, 2002) is in line with this reasoning. In their first study,
the researchers reported that positive and negative information
influence ambivalent individuals more than non-ambivalent
individuals (i.e., greater response amplification). Ambivalent
participants more strongly endorsed a positive/negative attitude
after the presentation of positive/negative information. More
interestingly, response amplification was further related to social
desirability concerns in that it was greater when ambivalence
was described negatively rather than positively (Bell and Esses,
2002, Study 2). In other words, individuals complied with the
message that presented ambivalence negatively. In support of
this reasoning, Cavazza and Butera (2008) reported that more
ambivalent individuals purposely sided with a normative source
of influence on topics that were directly related to the source’s
message but not on topics more indirectly related to this
message, unlike less ambivalent individuals. Thus, the proclivity
of ambivalent individuals to be influenced—quite a frequent
phenomenon (see Armitage and Conner, 2000; Hodson et al.,
2001 for instance)—might therefore be a sign of the attempt to
avoid the social undesirability of expressing ambivalent attitudes.
On the other hand, the aforementioned research by Cavazza
and Butera (2008) also suggested that attitudinal ambivalence
may be linked to social utility, as it may be instrumental in
adapting to the social environment, for instance, to resisting
persuasive pressure of the majority, since ambivalent participants
comply at a direct but not indirect level. Similarly, Weick (2002,
2004), in his theoretical papers, approached the concept of
ambivalence as being an “optimal compromise.” Ambivalence
was conceived of as a wise attitude that allows equilibrium
between knowledge and doubts (Weick, 1998, 2004). Indeed,
in a changing environment (such as fire crews fighting fires
for instance), competing tendencies can prevent people from
unwarranted persistence of behavior while providing both
confidence and cautiousness. In other terms, ambivalence can
be perceived as helpful in that it can allow a fast adaptation
to varying situations. Ambivalence has also been shown to be
beneficial in helping individuals interpret complex situations
(Guarana and Hernandez, 2015). In line with this idea, it also
has been suggested that ambivalence could be linked with critical
thinking, namely by enhancing mindfulness (Fiol and O’Connor,
2003) or cognitive elaboration (Yan, 2015). For instance, Piderit
(2000) argued that the expression of ambivalence is more likely to
generate dialogue in comparison with the expression of support
or opposition. Likewise, Green et al. (2000) reported that the
coexistence of conflicting attitudes could lead to higher message
scrutiny and integrative complexity. Erisen and Erisen (2014)
also highlighted that ambivalence could lead to greater tolerance
of different perspectives, resulting, for example in their study,
in greater support for Turkish membership in Europe. Focusing
on creativity, Fong (2006) reported that emotional ambivalence
could lead individuals to make more associations (i.e., to be
more creative) in comparison with happy or sad participants.
Ambivalent individuals were also found to be more accurate
in their judgment and forecasting compared to individuals
experiencing single-affect states (Rees et al., 2013). Finally,
ambivalence toward Europe was found to be positively related
with objective knowledge and news media consumption (i.e.,
political sophistication; Stoeckel, 2013). Attitudinal ambivalence
could therefore be perceived as a form of competence and
subsequently be perceived as socially useful.
If attitudinal ambivalence were associated with competence,
it still needs to be determined whether attitudinal ambivalence
could be associated with competence in case of controversial
issues, as proposed above, and in which cases. Stoeckel
(2013), who reported that disagreement among the elites (i.e.,
disagreement among political parties and leaders) on the
attitude toward Europe did increase the citizens’ probability of
being ambivalent by 16.5%, indirectly supported this idea. The
reasoning is that if elites are divided on an issue, their positions
will be more differentiated and more likely to be in competition
with one another. In return, citizens would be more likely to
be ambivalent toward the issue. Similarly, Plambeck and Weber
(2010) observed that strategic ambidexterity in an organization
(i.e., the inclusion of both offensive and defensive strategies)
leads to more ambivalence in a decision-making situation. In a
similar vein, Keele and Wolak (2008) highlighted that periods of
election campaigns could also represent a source of ambivalence
in the population, since elections generate a debate between
different political sides; hence, different points of view are
salient in people’s environment. Indeed, as Larsen pointed out,
ambivalence can indicate that one is “coming to grips with the
complexity of the world” (Larsen, cited in Wang, 2010).
In sum, the vast majority of research to date in social
psychology sustains that attitudinal ambivalence is a weak form
of attitude and an aversive state; in other words, a form of attitude
that should not be valued by individuals. However, some recent
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 June 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 961
Pillaud et al. Attitudinal Ambivalence and Social Judgment
research (in social psychology and in other research areas) has
shown that attitudinal ambivalence may have a positive effect
(such as enhancing mindfulness, wisdom, or creativity) and allow
resisting social influence. Four experiments have been designed
to investigate whether expressing attitudinal ambivalence in case
of controversial issues does indeed generate a positive image of
the target in observers, and if it does, why.
HYPOTHESES AND OVERVIEW
Based on the reasoning presented in the previous section, we
hypothesized that the expression of ambivalence should be
judged higher on social utility in comparison with univalent
attitudes when expressing ambivalence toward controversial
attitude objects (Hypothesis 1a). This should not be the case
for social desirability. Indeed, social norms (what majorities or
relevant others say and do) and social desirability are often
associated in the literature, since social norms exert social
influence (Gilibert and Cambon, 2003; Johnson and van de
Vijver, 2003). In other words, social desirability is related to the
extent to which an attitude expresses approval or disapproval
of a topic that is widely approved or disapproved. As noted
above, we view ambivalent attitudes as potentially indicating
competence, that is, a trait related to succeeding in a system
rather than pleasing the members of this system. We thus
reasoned that ambivalent attitudes cannot be judged higher on
social desirability compared to pro-normative attitudes. Instead,
we hypothesized that we should observe a linear effect of the
displayed attitude on social desirability in that the pro-normative
attitude should be evaluated as the most desirable, ambivalence
should be valued less (as it deviates from the pro-normative
attitude), and the counter-normative attitude should be the least
valued (as it is the most deviant attitude) (Hypothesis 1b).
As non-controversial consensual attitude objects imply that
there is a strong consensus on what the expressed response
should be (Pérez and Mugny, 1996), we reasoned that the pro-
normative attitude should be evaluated the highest, regardless
of the judgment’s dimension. Thus, we hypothesized that pro-
normative attitudes should be evaluated as higher on social utility
compared to the ambivalent ones, which should in turn be
evaluated as more useful compared to the counter-normative one
(Hypothesis 2a). We expected to find the same linear effect on
social desirability (Hypothesis 2b).
To test our hypotheses, we used the so-called “judge
paradigm” (Jellison and Green, 1981; Dubois, 1988). This
paradigm has beenwidely used to study the value of psychological
constructs. For instance, it has been successfully used to
investigate the social value of the preference for consistency
(Channouf and Mangard, 1997; Sénémeaud et al., 2011), of
intrinsic motivation (Cassignol-Bertrand et al., 2006), of the
belief in a just world (Alves and Correia, 2010), of individualism
and collectivism (Dubois and Beauvois, 2005; Green, 2006), of
achievement goals (Darnon et al., 2009), and of organizational
citizenship behavior (Esnard and Jouffre, 2008). In one of the
versions of this paradigm, the participants were invited to
evaluate several targets who vary in their endorsement of the
investigated trait (see Cambon et al., 2006). In our research, we
presented three profiles of three alleged previous participants
(namely, a bogus attitude questionnaire supposedly filled out by
the target), presenting a target with a positive attitude, one who
holds a negative attitude, and one displaying ambivalence. The
participants were required to judge each profile on both social
desirability and social utility.
We tested the first two hypotheses on different attitude objects
(Experiments 1–4). More precisely, Experiments 1 and 2 tested
Hypothesis 1 on controversial attitude objects (immigration and
death penalty), and Experiments 3 and 4 tested Hypothesis
2 on non-controversial attitude objects (organic products and
recycling).
The level of controversy over the above four attitude objects
has been assessed in a pilot study with a sample of Swiss
students, which was comparable to that of the main experiments.
Furthermore, an analysis of the literature revealed whether
positive or negative attitudes are pro or counter-normative;
this may be evident for consensual issues but needs to be
studied for controversial issues. Concerning controversial issues,
studies have found that although the issue of immigration is
recognized as controversial, Swiss citizens are on average in
favor of new immigration and hence tend to hold a positive
attitude toward it (Meuleman et al., 2009). Moreover, like
most Europeans, Swiss citizens held predominantly negative
attitudes toward death penalty (Unnever, 2010). Regarding
consensual issues, several papers convincingly highlighted the
social normativeness of holding a positive attitude toward
recycling and pro-environmental behaviors (e.g., Turaga et al.,
2010; Schwab et al., 2014). This effect was also observed for
organic products (Aertsens et al., 2009), toward which most
consumers held a positive attitude (Saba and Messina, 2003;
Kihlberg and Risvik, 2007).
PILOT STUDY
We conducted a first pilot study to ascertain that immigration
and death penalty are indeed perceived as controversial issues
and that organic products and recycling are considered non-
controversial issues. We selected a sample comparable to the
sample of participants recruited in the main experiments.
Participants and Method
One hundred and twenty-one students from a medium-size
Swiss university volunteered in this pilot study conducted on
the Internet using LimeSurvey. Among several other attitude
objects, the participants were asked to indicate their perception
of controversy or consensus over immigration, death penalty,
organic products, and recycling. More precisely, they were asked
to complete three 7-point bipolar scales devised for this pilot
study for each attitude object. The first bipolar scale ranged from
consensus (1) to controversy (7), the second from no debate (1) to
debate (7), and the third from amutual agreement (1) to a polemic
disagreement (7). The Cronbach’s alphas ranged from 0.75 for
immigration to 0.90 for death penalty; therefore, we averaged the
answers provided on the three items for each attitude object and
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considered them our dependent variables. The scale ranged from
1 (perception of consensus) to 7 (perception of controversy).
Results and Discussion
To test whether these attitude objects should be perceived
as controversial or consensual, we conducted t-tests against
the mid-point of the scale (i.e., 4). The analyses revealed
that immigration and death penalty were evaluated as being
controversial, (M = 5.92, SD = 0.90), t(120) = 23.52, p <
0.001, η2p = 0.82 for immigration, and (M = 4.38, SD =
1.88), t(120) = 2.20, p = 0.030, η
2
p = 0.03 for death penalty.
Moreover, organic products and recycling were evaluated as
consensual, (M = 3.26, SD = 1.22), t(120) = −6.69, p <
0.001, η2p = 0.27 for organic products, and (M = 3.20,
SD = 1.65), t(120) = −5.31, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.19 for
recycling.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants and Design
This web-based experiment was run on LimeSurvey. The
students of a medium-size Swiss university were solicited to
participate in the experiment as a part of psychology tutorials.
Fifty-two participants (34 females, 18 males) completed the
questionnaire. Their mean age was 22.06 years (SD = 2.91).
Preliminary analyses revealed that sex and age had no effect
on the studied outcomes (all ps > 0.1). The type of attitude
profiles was included as a within-participants variable presented
in a random order. The participants had to evaluate three
alleged previous participants who expressed a positive attitude,
a negative attitude, and an ambivalent attitude toward the same
attitude object. No order effect was observed on the evaluations
(all ps > 0.1). Therefore, order of presentation, sex and age have
not been included in the reported analyses. This is true for all
other experiments.
Procedure and Materials
The experiment was presented as a follow-up of a previous
study on attitudes. In this bogus previous study, the participants
were allegedly asked to complete eight items assessing their
attitude toward immigration measured on a 7-point Likert scale
(ranging from 1 = not at all to 7 = very much). In fact, the
experimenter had filled out the questionnaire in advance and
generated three specific profiles of participants. The first profile
displayed a univalent positive attitude toward immigration
(positive condition) by always circling either 6 or 7. The second
profile reported a univalent negative attitude (negative condition)
by only circling 1 or 2. The third profile presented an ambivalent
attitude by agreeing on four of the items (circling 6 or 7) and
disagreeing on the four others (circling 1 or 2). This profile
constituted the ambivalent condition. It is important to note
that in the ambivalent profile, the target is depicted as holding
both strongly positive and strongly negative attitudes toward
the same issue on different dimensions, which implies that the
target is ambivalent rather than does not care about or holds
moderate attitudes toward the issue. These dimensions were
not explicitly emphasized to avoid suspicion. Nevertheless, the
participants could realize that the target strongly agreed with
items 1–4 and strongly disagreed with items 5–8, based on which
they could infer that these items referred to different aspects of
the same topic (e.g., ethical and policy aspects of immigration;
see Appendix in Supplementary Material).
The participants were then asked to evaluate each profile
based on the answers to 8 items, with 4 items measuring social
desirability (nice, likable, appreciable and pleasant) and 4 items
assessing social utility (competent, smart, gifted and likely to
succeed academically), using the same materials as Dompnier
et al. (2008). Evaluations were made on a 7-points Likert scale
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) for each of these traits.
The Cronbach’s alphas for social desirability ranged from 0.96 to
0.98, depending on the profile. The alphas for social utility varied
from 0.94 to 0.97. Therefore, we averaged the four traits for each
dimension and used them as dependent variables1.
Results and Discussion
Since immigration has been shown in the pilot study to
be a controversial attitude object, we hypothesized that the
ambivalent profile should be rated the highest on social utility
in comparison with the two other profiles (H1a). On the other
hand, given that on average Swiss individuals are open to new
immigration (Meuleman et al., 2009), we hypothesized that we
should observe a decreasing linear trend on social desirability
from the positive to the ambivalent and to the negative profiles
(H1b).
1It could be argued that before we move to the main studies, we also need to check
one important assumption underlying our hypothesis, namely that attitudinal
ambivalence may indeed signal competence, i.e., that one is critically appraising
the issue.
This web-based experiment was run on LimeSurvey with 146 women and 21
men (mean age 20.53 years, SD = 3.31). The participants were told that we were
conducting a study on attitudes toward death penalty. The same procedure was
used as in Experiment 1 in that three profiles displaying a positive attitude, an
ambivalent attitude, and a negative attitude were presented in a random order
to the participants who had to evaluate each profile. They had to evaluate each
profile using six items. Two items assessed critical thinking (critical/critique and
thoughtful/réfléchi; r = 0.62, p < 0.001), and we also introduced two items that
assessed dissent (deviant/déviant and dissenter/contestataire; r = 0.24, p = 0.002)
and two that assessed cautiousness (careful/prudent and pernickety/pointilleux, r=
0.31, p< 0.001) to test other possible meanings of ambivalence. We aggregated the
two items per dimension and used these three indices as our dependent variables.
Contrast analysis showed that the ambivalent profile has been evaluated
significantly higher on critical thinking (M = 4.27) compared to the positive (M
= 3.72) and the negative one (M = 4.02), F(1, 166) = 6.45, p = 0.012, η
2
p= 0.037.
The orthogonal contrast did not reach significance, F(1, 166) = 2.61, p> 0.10. Thus,
ambivalent attitudes were rated higher on critical thinking compared to clear-cut
attitudes.
The contrast test of the ambivalent profile against the other two on the
dissent dimension did not reach significance, F(1, 166) = 3.20, p > 0.05. However,
the orthogonal contrast yielded a significant effect, F(1, 166) = 4.09, p = 0.045,
indicating that the negative profile has been evaluated as less dissenting (M= 3.32)
compared to the ambivalent (M = 3.63) and the positive one (M = 3.59). Hence,
ambivalent attitudes have not been acknowledged as more deviant compared to
clear-cut attitudes.
We did not observe any significant differences in cautiousness as a function of
the profiles for both contrasts, all ps > 0.10. Hence, the ambivalent profile (M =
3.85), the negative profile (M = 3.62), and the positive profile (M = 3.75) were
rated the same.
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Social Utility
To test hypothesis 1a, we designed a within-participant planned
contrast, testing the score in the ambivalent condition (2)
against both the score in the positive (−1) and in the
negative condition (−1). Moreover, the score in the positive
condition (1) was tested against the score in the negative
condition (−1) in an orthogonal contrast; the score in the
ambivalence condition was set as 0. The proper use of
contrast analysis requires the planned contrast that tests the
hypothesis to be significant, and the orthogonal contrast testing
the residual to be non-significant (Judd and McClelland,
1989).
The test of this planned contrast reached significance, F(1, 51)
= 4.93, p = 0.031, η2p = 0.08. In comparison with both the
positive (M = 4.00, SD= 1.19) and the negative (M = 3.75, SD=
1.37), the ambivalent profile (M= 4.31, SD= 1.40) was evaluated
as significantly higher on social utility. The orthogonal contrast
was not significant, F < 1.
Social Desirability
To test hypothesis 1b on this dimension, we designed a within-
participant planned contrast whereby the score in the positive
condition (1) has been tested against the score in the negative
condition (−1) and the score in the ambivalent condition was
set as 0 to test the expected linear relation. Moreover, the score in
the ambivalence condition (2) was tested against the score in the
negative (−1) and in the positive condition (−1) in an orthogonal
contrast.
The test of our planned linear contrast yielded a significant
effect on social desirability, F(1, 51) = 12.44, p < 0.001, η
2
p
= 0.19. Being in favor of immigration was rated as more
desirable (M = 4.40, SD = 1.37) than being ambivalent (M
= 4.10, SD = 1.35), than being against immigration (M =
3.28, SD = 1.50). The test of the orthogonal contrast did
not reach significance, F(1, 51) = 2.43, p > 0.10. These results
provide support for our first hypothesis, in that the participants
rated the ambivalent profile the highest on social utility,
whereas we observed a linear decrease in social desirability
moving from the positive attitude to the negative one (see
Figure 1A).
EXPERIMENT 2
Method
Participants and Design
This web-based experiment was run on LimeSurvey,
administered through social network websites, and tested
the same hypotheses as those proposed in Experiment 1. The
participants were recruited to participate in an experiment about
death penalty, again a controversial issue according to the pilot
study. Sixty-nine participants completed the questionnaire. Their
mean age was 23.96 years (SD = 6.55). The design was identical
to that of Experiment 1. Four participants were dropped from
the analysis because of a large Cook’s distance (Hutcheson and
Sofroniou, 1999). The final sample consisted of 45 females and
20 males. Their mean age was 24.08 years (SD= 6.72).
Procedure and Materials
The experiment was introduced as a study about attitudes toward
death penalty. The same procedure was used as in Experiment
1, that is, the participants had to judge three alleged participants
of a previous study. Profiles displaying a positive attitude, an
ambivalent attitude, and a negative attitude were presented in a
random order to the participants who had to evaluate each profile
with the same four social desirability and four social utility traits
as before. The Cronbach’s alphas for social desirability ranged
from 0.95 to 0.97, depending on the profile, the alphas for social
utility varied from 0.92 to 0.95. Therefore, we averaged the four
traits for each dimension and considered these variables as our
main dependent variables.
Results and Discussion
Since death penalty has been shown in the pilot study to
be a controversial attitude object, we hypothesized that the
ambivalent profile should be rated the highest on social utility
in comparison with the two other profiles (H1a). On the other
hand, given that most Swiss individuals are against death penalty
(Unnever, 2010), we hypothesized that we should observe a
decreasing linear trend on social desirability across the positive,
the ambivalent, and the negative profiles.
Social Utility
The score in the ambivalent condition (2) has been tested against
both the score in the positive (−1) and in the negative condition
(−1). The test of this planned contrast (H1a) yielded a significant
effect, F(1, 64) = 4.74, p = 0.033, η
2
p = 0.06. In comparison with
both the positive (M = 3.56, SD = 1.44) and the negative (M =
3.76, SD = 1.36), the ambivalent profile (M = 3.96, SD =1.11)
was evaluated the highest on social utility. The positive profile
and the negative profile, compared in the orthogonal contrast,
did not differ significantly, F < 1.
Social Desirability
The test of a linear contrast (H1b) yielded a significant effect
on social desirability, F(1, 64) = 8.33, p = 0.005, η
2
p = 0.11.
Being against death penalty was rated as more desirable (M =
4.09, SD = 1.30) compared to being ambivalent (M = 3.89, SD
= 1.11) or favorable (M = 3.28, SD = 1.42). The test of the
orthogonal contrast did not reach significance, F(1, 68) = 2.65,
p > 0.10. These results provide support for our first hypothesis
with a different controversial attitude object. Specifically, the
participants rated the ambivalent profile the highest on social
utility, whereas we observed a linear decrease in desirability from
the negative attitude to the positive one (see Figure 1B).
EXPERIMENT 3
Method
Participants and Design
This web-based experiment was run on LimeSurvey to test
Hypothesis 2. This time, the participants were recruited through
social network websites to participate in an experiment about
organic products, a non-controversial attitude object. Thirty-five
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FIGURE 1 | Social utility and social desirability as a function of the profiles’ attitude and the controversy level of the attitude object. (A) Immigration. (B) Death penalty.
(C) Organic products. (D) Recycling.
participants (28 females, 7 males) completed the questionnaires.
Their mean age was 29.49 years (SD= 16.38).
Procedure and Materials
The experiment was introduced as a study about attitudes toward
organic products. The same procedure was used as for previous
experiments: Profiles displaying a positive attitude, an ambivalent
attitude, and a negative attitude were presented in random order
to the participants who had to evaluate each profile with the same
four social desirability and four social utility traits as before. The
Cronbach’s alpha across profiles ranged from 0.96 to 0.98 for
social desirability and from 0.89 to 0.97 for social utility.
Results and Discussion
Social Utility
In Hypothesis 2, we predicted that for non-controversial attitude
objects, we should observe a linear trend for both social utility
and social desirability. Consequently, the score of social utility
should be the highest for the positive profile, indicating that
a positive attitude toward organic products is pro-normative
(Aertsens et al., 2009), and the lowest for the negative profile,
with the ambivalent profile in the middle. Contrast analyses
revealed that the linear contrast was indeed significant, F(1, 34)
= 22.68, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.40. The participants evaluated the
positive profile the highest (M = 4.28, SD = 1.03), followed by
the ambivalent profile (M = 3.57, SD =1.37) and the negative
profile (M = 3.12, SD = 1.17). The orthogonal contrast did not
reach significance, F < 1.
Social Desirability
The test of a linear contrast yielded a significant effect, F(1, 34) =
31.93, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.48. Being in favor of organic products
was judged as being more desirable (M = 4.45, SD = 1.03) in
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comparison with an ambivalent (M = 3.77, SD =1.02) and a
negative profile (M = 3.21, SD = 1.06). The orthogonal contrast
did not reach significance, F < 1.
As predicted by Hypotheses 2a and 2b, the positive profile
was rated the highest on both social desirability and social
utility, followed by the ambivalent and the negative profiles (see
Figure 1C).
EXPERIMENT 4
Method
Participants and Design
This web-based experiment was run on LimeSurvey again to
test Hypothesis 2. This time, the participants were recruited
through social network websites to participate in an experiment
about recycling, a non-controversial attitude object. Fifty-one
participants (38 females, 13 males) completed the questionnaires.
Their mean age was 25.39 years (SD= 10.08).
Procedure and Materials
The participants were told that we were conducting a study
about attitudes toward recycling. The same procedure was used
as in previous experiments. Three profiles displaying a positive
attitude, an ambivalent attitude, and a negative attitude were
presented in a random order to the participants who had to
evaluate each profile with the same four social desirability and
four social utility traits as before. The Cronbach’s alpha for social
desirability ranged from 0.92 to 0.96 while alphas for social utility
varied from 0.83 to 0.82. Therefore, we calculated the means
of the four traits for each dimension and used them as our
dependent variables.
Results and Discussion
Social Utility
We hypothesized a linear trend on both social utility and
social desirability, as recycling emerged as a non-controversial
topic in the Pilot Study, with the positive attitude being the
most positively evaluated, since social norms encourage pro-
environmental behaviors (Turaga et al., 2010; Schwab et al.,
2014). The test of a linear contrast yielded a significant effect,
F(1, 50) = 67.04, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.57. Being in favor of recycling
was judged as more useful (M = 4.68, SD = 0.97) in comparison
with an ambivalent profile (M = 3.79, SD = 1.38), which in turn
was judgedmore useful compared to a negative profile (M= 2.75,
SD= 1.05). The orthogonal contrast was not significant, F < 1.
Social Desirability
The test of a linear contrast yielded a significant effect, F(1, 50)
= 64.23, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.56. The profile presenting a positive
attitude was evaluated more desirable (M = 4.86, SD = 1.04)
compared to the ambivalent profile (M = 3.59, SD = 1.32),
which in turn was evaluated as more desirable compared to the
negative profile (M = 2.61, SD = 1.25). The orthogonal contrast
did not reach significance, F < 1. Concerning organic products,
the positive pro-normative profile was rated the highest on both
social utility and social desirability, followed by the ambivalent
and the negative profile (see Figure 1D).
META-ANALYSIS
In the work reported above, we used four different attitude
objects in four separate studies. In order to ensure that our effects
on social utility were driven by the type of the attitude object (i.e.,
controversial vs. consensual), as proposed, and not by the attitude
object itself (death penalty or recycling, for instance), the data
of the four studies have been combined into a new database to
run a small-scale meta-analysis (Hox et al., 2017). This analysis
has not been conducted for social desirability, as the effects were
not expected to differ as a function of the type of attitude object.
We built a three-level multilevel analysis in which social utility
scores (N1−4 = 621 level-1 units, i.e., 207 participants who had
three social utility scores, one per profile: Study 1 = 52∗3, Study
2 = 69∗3, Study 3 = 35∗3 and Study 4 = 51∗3) were nested
within participants (K1−4 = 207 level-2 units), which were nested
within studies (L1−4 = 4 level-3 units, random effect). Thus, the
intercept was allowed to vary across both participants and studies.
All participants were included in the analysis (removing the four
outliers in Study 2 did not alter any of the reported results).
Results and Discussion
The first analysis tested whether social utility judgments
significantly differed as a function of type and profiles.
Random effects pertaining to participants and studies were
also included in the model. The 2 (type of attitude object:
controversial, consensual) × 3 (profile: positive, negative,
ambivalent) interaction reached significance, χ2
(2, 621)
= 33.35,
p < 0.001. Ratings therefore differed as a function of the type of
attitude object and profile.
The interaction has then been decomposed into two simple
effects to reproduce the analyses carried out in experiments 1–4:
Attitude type was then dummy coded (controversial, consensual)
and the same two contrasts used in the single experiments
were tested, i.e., a quadratic contrast (−1 2 −1) and a linear
contrast (1 0−1) for the pro-normative, ambivalent and counter-
normative condition. The effect of type of attitudes object was
not significant, Z = 1.53, p = 0.126. Contrast analyses on
controversial attitude objects revealed a significant effect of the
quadratic contrast on social utility, Z = 2.57, p = 0.01 whereas
the linear contrast was not significant, Z = −1.45, p = 0.147.
Conversely, the analysis on consensual attitude objects revealed
that the linear contrast reached significance,Z=−8.44, p< 0.001
whereas the quadratic did not, Z =−0.04, p= 0.965.
These results thus reproduced those observed in experiments
1–4 and suggest the moderating role of controversial/non-
controversial attitude objects. Ambivalent attitudes were valued
more in terms of social utility compared to the expression of both
a pro-normative and a counter-normative attitude when the topic
was controversial; however, a pro-normative attitude was favored
when the topic was non-controversial.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The vast majority of research on attitudes to date considers that
attitudinal ambivalence is a weak form of attitude and an aversive
state; in other words, a form of attitude that individuals should
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not value given its consequences. However, this speculation has
hitherto never been tested and no research has assessed the social
perception of the expression of ambivalence. Two elements make
this research essential. First, the fact that individuals display
ambivalence in an attempt to achieve positive self-presentation
(Pillaud et al., 2013), although interesting in and of itself,
does not imply that such attempt is successful and that the
display of ambivalent attitudes is indeed socially valued by an
observer (Dubois and Beauvois, 2005). Second, as we noted
above, although some theoretical analyses have suggested that
ambivalence may be valued, no research so far has provided
empirical evidence that this may be the case or investigated why
expressing attitudinal ambivalence may generate a positive image
in observers. In fact, no work has directly investigated the social
perception of the expression of ambivalent attitudes.
In this article, we proposed that ambivalence could have a
specific function of signaling competence when being expressed
on controversial issues. This reasoning has been rooted in several
studies that linked ambivalence and a wide array of cognitions,
for instance, critical thinking and wisdom (Weick, 1998, 2004;
Piderit, 2000), amount of knowledge (Stoeckel, 2013), and
strategic thinking (Plambeck and Weber, 2010). Furthermore,
ambivalence has been shown to serve some adaptive function
(Guarana and Hernandez, 2015). Indeed, ambivalent attitudes
were discussed as providing equilibrium in complex situations
(Costarelli, 2011; Pagliaro et al., 2012) and allowing individuals
to resist majority influence (Cavazza and Butera, 2008). Thus,
we hypothesized that individuals expressing ambivalent attitudes
toward controversial issues could be valued on social utility,
unlike individuals expressing univalent attitudes.
More specifically, we hypothesized that an individual
expressing ambivalent attitudes on controversial attitude objects
should be judged higher on social utility in comparison with an
individual expressing univalent attitudes, either pro-normative
or counter-normative (Hypothesis 1a). We consequently
predicted that the benefit of expressing ambivalent attitudes
should not be observed on social desirability. We expected to
observe a decreasing linear effect from the pro-normative to
the ambivalent attitude, with the counter-normative attitude
being less desirable (Hypothesis 1b). Because consensual attitude
objects imply a strong consensus about what the expressed
response should be (Pérez and Mugny, 1996), we hypothesized
that the pro-normative attitude should be rated the highest for
both social utility and social desirability. Hence, we predicted
that they should be evaluated as more useful compared to the
ambivalent one, which should in turn be evaluated as more
useful compared to the counter-normative one for consensual
attitude objects (Hypothesis 2a). The same trend was expected
for social desirability (Hypothesis 2b).
The results supported both hypotheses. Regarding
controversial attitude objects, namely immigration and death
penalty (Experiments 1 and 2), we observed that ambivalence
was evaluated significantly higher on social utility compared
to univalent positive and univalent negative attitudes, in line
with Hypothesis 1a. Moreover, in line with Hypothesis 1b, we
observed a linear decrease from the pro-normative attitude
to the ambivalent one and finally to the counter-normative
one on both immigration and death penalty2. The pattern of
result was different for consensual attitude objects, namely
organic products and recycling (Experiments 3 and 4). We
found the expected linear trend for both social utility and social
desirability, whereby the univalent positive attitude (in both
cases the pro-normative attitude) was rated higher compared
to ambivalent attitude, which in turn was evaluated higher
compared to univalent negative attitude. These effects were
confirmed by the final small-scale meta-analysis.
These results contribute to the recent literature on attitudinal
ambivalence by providing the evidence that the expression of
ambivalent attitudes could be socially valued by an observer
while providing insight into the mechanism responsible for
this attribution of value. The present results indeed reveal
that the expression of attitudinal ambivalence is recognized as
competence (i.e., more socially useful) when it is expressed on
a controversial attitude object. It has recently been reported that
individuals could display more ambivalence toward controversial
issues to gain social approval (Pillaud et al., 2013). The present
research complements these findings by showing that by doing
so, ambivalent individuals are evaluated as more competent
compared to individuals displaying univalent attitudes (both pro-
and anti-normative ones).
In fact, our results allow us to go a step further, as they
show that ambivalence may indeed be perceived as bearing
some social value, to the extent that it can be interpreted
as a form of competence, as it is the case for attitudes
regarding controversial issues. Such results are directly in line
with the literature in which ambivalence has been linked
to wisdom, mindfulness, and knowledge. By acknowledging
both sides of controversial attitude objects, the expression
of ambivalence is recognized as competence. They also help
interpret the results of Costarelli (2011) and Brauer et al.
(2012), who showed that the expression of ambivalence or
mixed messages is considered as the most balanced, realistic,
and acceptable when being expressed toward out-groups. As
attitude expression toward out-groups is quite complex, mixed
attitudes could then have been perceived as the most skillful
solution.
This research could explain why ambivalence has been studied
as something negative in the history of research on attitudes.
First, if ambivalent attitudes are quite prevalent (Breckler, 2004;
2Two further experiments, not reported in full here because of their redundancy,
perfectly replicated the findings of Experiments 1 and 2. Forty participants
completed an experiment on repeating school years, and one-hundred participants
participated in another experiment about having children, two controversial
attitude objects. Performing the same contrast analyses as in Experiments 1 and
2, the results showed that the participants judged the ambivalent profile as higher
on social utility compared to the univalent profiles in both studies, respectively,
for repeating school years, F(1, 39) = 4.67, p = 0.037, ηp
2
= 0.107, and for having
children, F(1, 99) = 11.26, p = 0.01, ηp
2
= 0.09. The orthogonal contrasts were
not significant, all ps > 0.10. Concerning social desirability, the linear trend was
also replicated, with the univalent pro-normative profile being evaluated higher on
social desirability compared to the ambivalent profile, followed by the univalent
anti-normative profile for repeating school years, F(1, 39) = 9.99, p = 0.003, ηp
2
= 0.20, and for having children, F(1, 99) = 139.38, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.58. The
orthogonal contrasts were not significant, all ps> 0.10. For additional information,
please contact the authors.
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Weisbrode, 2012), controversies surrounding attitude objects are
quite rare and episodic: although the media may depict many of
the daily reported issues as controversial for marketing reasons,
most people strive to hold non-controversial positions, to such
an extent that Moscovici and Faucheux (1972) have termed this
tendency a “conformity bias.” We thus believe that in most cases,
ambivalent individuals could feel a social pressure that would
push them to pick a side. Laponce (1974) and Weisbrode (2012)
indeed argued that we tend to dichotomize the world and then
view its parts as being opposed. Because ambivalence is associated
with inconsistencies and fluctuations (Lavine, 2001; Fabrigar
et al., 2005) and because consistency is valued (Guadagno
and Cialdini, 2010), ambivalence toward consensual issues can
therefore be seen as “abnormal.” Consequently, ambivalent
individuals could be motivated not to present themselves as
ambivalent and instead express univalent attitudes.
Such reasoning can also provide a better understanding of
why ambivalent individuals can indeed feel conflicted. If we
acknowledge that decision-making situations could generate
discomfort in themselves (as van Harreveld et al., 2009b,
suggested), discomfort could also stem in part from social
considerations. In line with the above argument, ambivalent
individuals could see themselves as deviant on consensual issues,
and decision-making situations could highlight this feeling
(Janis, 1972). As a reminder, Fong (2006) discussed ambivalent
emotions as “unusual.” Future research should consequently
address this question by assessing discomfort of ambivalent
individuals in decision-making situations by accounting for the
level of controversy of the attitude object. It is plausible to expect
that individuals should experience more discomfort when they
perceive a strong consensus on the attitude to be expressed, but
less so when the attitude object is perceived as controversial.
Moreover, some target’s and observer’s characteristics or status
might influence the appreciation of ambivalence expression.
For example, as leaders who express emotional complexity
induce positive inferences of cognitive flexibility from followers
(Rothman and Melwani, 2017), the reciprocal status of target
and observers may influence the evaluation of ambivalence
expression. Furthermore, to the extent that political liberals are
more likely compared to conservatives to tolerate uncertainty
and ambiguity, enjoy thinking, and prolong cognitive closure
(e.g., Jost et al., 2003), it follows that they should be more
inclined to value others’ ambivalence expression. Future research
should investigate the possible moderating role of these
characteristics.
This study has limitations that could open avenue for new
research. In this article, we used different attitude objects,
chosen after a pilot study that revealed their different level of
controversy; however, future research could try to replicate this
study using longitudinal methods to study how the perception of
ambivalence could fluctuate as a consequence of controversies.
For instance, Groenendyk (2016) highlighted that Democrats
were more ambivalent toward President Obama after he reacted
to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons
against his own people. It would therefore be interesting to focus
on political figures or on social issues (such as gay marriage or
gun control) that are more or less controversial at different time
points. The study of such phenomena could represent a dynamic
approach to the study of the perception of ambivalence.
In sum, this research and its results bring convergent support
for viewing attitudinal ambivalence as useful. When being
expressed on controversial issues, ambivalent attitudes were
recognized as signaling competence over and above univalent
attitudes. After more than two decades of research that has
focused on its weaknesses and negative consequences, the present
researchmight open the way to the functional study of attitudinal
ambivalence.
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